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Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to describe an axiomatic utility theory for Dempster-Shafer
belief function lotteries. The axiomatic framework used is analogous to von Neumann-
Morgenstern’s utility theory for probabilistic lotteries as described by Luce and Raiffa. Un-
like the probabilistic case, our axiomatic framework leads to interval-valued utilities, and
therefore, to a partial (incomplete) preference order on the set of all belief function lotter-
ies. If the belief function reference lotteries we use are Bayesian belief functions, then our
representation theorem coincides with Jaffray’s representation theorem for his linear utility
theory for belief functions. We illustrate our representation theorem using some examples
discussed in the literature, and we propose a simple model for assessing utilities based on
an interval-valued pessimism index representing a decision-maker’s attitude to ambiguity
and indeterminacy. Finally, we compare our decision theory with those proposed by Jaffray,
Smets, Dubois et al., Giang and Shenoy, and Shafer.
Keywords: Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, von Neumann-Morgenstern’s utility
theory, interval-valued utility function, Jaffray’s linear utility theory, Smets’ two-level
decision theory, Shafer’s constructive decision theory.
1. Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to propose an axiomatic utility theory for lotteries described
by belief functions in the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence [5, 39]. The axiomatic
theory is constructed similar to von Neumann-Morgenstern’s (vN-M’s) utility theory for
probabilistic lotteries [51, 29, 28, 37, 34, 17]. Unlike the probabilistic case, our axiomatic
theory leads to interval-valued utilities, and therefore to a partial (incomplete) preference
order on the set of all belief function lotteries. Also, we compare our decision theory to
those proposed by Jaffray [30], Smets [48], Dubois et al. [11], Giang and Shenoy [21, 22],
and Shafer [44].
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In the foreword to Glenn Shafer’s 1976 monograph [39], Dempster writes: “... I believe
that Bayesian inference will always be a basic tool for practical everyday statistics, if only
because questions must be answered and decisions must be taken, so that a statistician must
always stand ready to upgrade his vaguer forms of belief into precisely additive probabilities.”
More than 40 years after these lines were written, a lot of approaches to decision-making
have been proposed (see the recent review in [7]). However, most of these methods lack
a strong theoretical basis. The most important steps toward a decision theory in the D-S
framework have been made by Jaffray [30], Smets [48] and Shafer [44]. However, we argue
that these proposals are either not sufficiently justified from the point of view of D-S theory,
or not sufficiently developed for practical use. Our goal is to propose and justify a utility
theory that is in line with vN-M’s utility theory, but adapted to be used with lotteries whose
uncertainty is described by D-S belief functions.
In essence, the D-S theory consists of representations— basic probability assignments
(also called mass functions), belief functions, plausibility functions, etc.—together with
Dempster’s combination rule, and a rule for marginalizing joint belief functions. The rep-
resentation part of the D-S theory is also used in various other theories of belief functions.
For example, in the imprecise probability community, a belief function is viewed as the lower
envelope of a convex set of probability mass functions called a credal set. Credal set se-
mantics are also referred to in the literature as lower probability interpretation [31, 32, 33],
and as generalized probability [16, 27]. Using these semantics, it makes more sense to use
the Fagin-Halpern combination rule [16] (also proposed by de Campos et al. [4]), rather
than Dempster’s combination rule [27, 42, 43]. The utility theory this article proposes is
designed specifically for the D-S belief function theory, and not for the other theories of
belief functions. This suggests that Dempster’s combination rule should be an integral part
of our theory, a property that is not satisfied in the proposals by Jaffray and Smets.
There is a large literature on decision making with a (credal) set of probability mass
functions [23] motivated by Ellsberg’s paradox [15]. An influential work in this area is the
axiomatic framework by Gilboa-Schmeidler [24], where they use Choquet integration [3, 25]
to compute expected utility. A belief function is a special case of a Choquet capacity.
Jaffray’s [30] work can also be regarded as belonging to the same line of research, although
Jaffray works directly with belief functions without specifying a combination rule. A review
of this literature can be found in, e.g., [18], where the authors propose a modification of
the Gilboa-Schmeidler [24] axioms. As we said earlier, our focus here is on decision-making
with D-S theory of belief functions, and not on decision-making based in belief functions
with a credal set interpretation. As we will see, our interval-valued utility functions lead to
intervals that are contained in the Choquet lower and upper expected utility intervals.
The remainder of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we sketch vN-M’s axiomatic
utility theory for probabilistic lotteries as described by Luce and Raiffa [37]. In Section
3, we summarize the basic definitions in the D-S belief function theory. In Section 4, we
describe our adaptation of vN-M’s utility theory for lotteries in which uncertainty is described
by D-S belief functions. Our assumptions lead to an interval-valued utility function, and
consequently, to a partial (incomplete) preference order on the set of all belief function
lotteries. We also describe a model for assessments of utilities. In Section 5, we compare our
utility theory with those described by Jaffray [30], Smets [48], Dubois et al. [11], Giang and
Shenoy [21, 22], and Shafer [44]. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize and conclude.
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2. von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Utility Theory
In this section, we describe vN-M’s utility theory for decision under risk. Most of the
material in this section is adapted from [37]. A decision problem can be seen as a situation
in which a decision-maker (DM) has to choose a course of action (or act) in some set F. An
act may have different outcomes, depending on the state of nature X. Exactly one state of
nature will obtain, but this state is unknown. Denoting by ΩX = {x1, . . . , xn} the set of
states of nature and by O = {O1, . . . , Or} the set of outcomes1, an act can thus be formalized
as a mapping f from Ω to O. In this section, we assume that uncertainty about the state
of nature is described by a probability mass function (PMF) pX on ΩX . In vN-M’s original
exposition [51], probabilities on ΩX are assumed to be objective and to correspond to long-
run frequencies. However, the line of reasoning summarized below is also valid with other
interpretations of probabilities, such as additive degrees of belief, provided that probabilities
are assumed to have been determined beforehand, independently of the decision problem. For
instance, in the constructive approach proposed by Shafer [44], probabilities are constructed
by comparing a given problem with a scale of examples in which the truth is generated
according to known chances2.
If the DM selects act f , they will get outcome Oi with probability
pi =
∑
{x∈ΩX |f(x)=Oi}
pX(x). (1)
To each act f thus corresponds a PMF p = (p1, . . . , pr) on O. We call L = [O,p] a
probabilistic lottery. As only one state in ΩX will obtain, a probabilistic lottery will result
in exactly one outcome Oi (with probability pi), and we suppose that the lottery will not
be repeated. Another natural assumption is that two acts that induce the same lottery are
equivalent: the problem of expressing preference between acts then boils down to expressing
preference between lotteries.
We are thus concerned with a DM who has preferences on L, the set of all probabilistic
lotteries on O, and our task is to find a real-valued utility function u : L → R such that the
DM strictly prefers L to L′ if and only if u(L) > u(L′), and the DM is indifferent between
L and L′ if and only if u(L) = u(L′). We write Oi  Oj if the DM strictly prefers Oi to Oj,
write Oi ∼ Oj if the DM is indifferent between (or equally prefers) Oi and Oj, and write
Oi % Oj if the DM either strictly prefers Oi to Oj or is indifferent between the two.
Of course, finding such a utility function is not always possible, unless the DM’s prefer-
ences satisfy some assumptions. We can then construct a utility function that is linear in
the sense that the utility of a lottery L = [O,p] is equal to its expected utility
∑r
i=1 pi u(Oi),
where Oi is regarded as a degenerate lottery where the only possible outcome is Oi with
probability 1. In the remainder of this section, we describe a set of assumptions that lead to
the existence of such a linear utility function.
1The assumption of finiteness of the sets ΩX and O is only for ease of exposition. It is unnecessary for
the proof of the representation theorem in this section.
2Savage [38] derives both probabilities and utilities from a set of axioms. This approach will not be
considered in this paper.
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Figure 1: A two-stage compound lottery reduced to an indifferent simple lottery
Assumption 2.1 (Weak ordering of outcomes). For any two outcomes Oi and Oj, either
Oi % Oj or Oj % Oi. Also, if Oi % Oj and Oj % Ok, then Oi % Ok. Thus, the preference
relation % over O is a weak order, i.e., it is complete and transitive.
Given Assumption 2.1, without loss of generality, let us assume that the outcomes are
labelled such that O1 % O2 % · · · % Or, and to avoid trivialities, assume that O1  Or.
Suppose that L = {L(1), . . . , L(s)} is a set of s lotteries, where each of the s lotteries
Lj = [O,p(j)] are over outcomes in O, with PMFs p(j) for j = 1, . . . , s. Suppose q =
(q1, . . . , qs) is a PMF on L such that qj > 0 for j = 1, . . . , s, and
∑s
j=1 qj = 1. Then [L,q]
is called a compound lottery whose outcome is exactly one lottery L(i) (with probability
qi), and lottery L
(i) will result in one outcome Oj (with probability p
(i)
j ). Notice that the
PMF p(i) is a conditional PMF for O in the second stage given that lottery L(i) is realized
(with probability qi > 0) in the first stage (see Figure 1). We can compute the joint PMF
for (L,O), and then compute the marginal p of the joint for O. The following assumption
states that the resulting lottery [O,p] is indifferent to the compound lottery [L,q].
Assumption 2.2 (Reduction of compound lotteries). Any compound lottery [L, q], where
L(i) = [O,p(i)], is indifferent to a simple (non-compound) lottery [O, p], where
pi = q1 p
(1)
i + . . .+ qs p
(s)
i (2)
for i = 1, . . . , r. PMF (p1, . . . , pr) is the marginal for O of the joint PMF of (L,O).
A simple lottery involving only outcomesO1 andOr with PMF (u, 1−u), where 0 ≤ u ≤ 1,
is called a reference lottery, and is denoted by [{O1, Or}, (u, 1− u)]. Let O2 denote the set
{O1, Or}.
Assumption 2.3 (Continuity). Each outcome Oi is indifferent to a reference lottery
O˜i = [O2, (ui, 1− ui)] for some ui, where 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1, i.e., Oi ∼ O˜i.
Assumption 2.4 (Weak order). The preference relation % for lotteries in L is a weak order,
i.e., it is complete and transitive.
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Figure 2: The substitutability assumption 2.5
Assumption 2.4 generalizes Assumption 2.1 for outcomes, which can be regarded as de-
generate lotteries.
Assumption 2.5 (Substitutability). In any lottery L = [O,p], if we substitute an outcome
Oi by the reference lottery O˜i = [O2, (ui, 1 − ui)] that is indifferent to Oi, then the result is
a compound lottery that is indifferent to L (see Figure 2), i.e,
[(O1, . . . , Oi−1, Oi, Oi+1, . . . , Or),p] ∼ [(O1, . . . , Oi−1, O˜i, Oi+1, . . . , Or),p].
From Assumptions 2.1–2.5, given any lottery L = [O,p], it is possible to find a reference
lottery L˜ = [O2, (u, 1 − u)] that is indifferent to L (see Figure 3). This is expressed by
Theorem 2.1 below.
Theorem 2.1 (Reducing a lottery to an indifferent reference lottery). Under Assumptions
2.1-2.5, any lottery L = [O,p] is indifferent to a reference lottery L˜ = [O2, (u, 1− u)] with
u =
r∑
i=1
pi ui. (3)
Proof. ([37]) First, we replace each Oi by O˜i for i = 1, . . . , r. Assumption 2.3 (continuity)
states that these indifferent lotteries exist, and Assumption 2.5 (substitutability) says that
they are substitutable without changing the preference relation. So by using Assumption 2.4
serially, [O,p] ∼ [O˜,p]. Now if we apply Assumption 2.2 (reduction of compound lotteries),
then [O,p] ∼ [O2, (u, 1− u)], where u is given by Eq. (3).
Assumption 2.6 (Monotonicity). A reference lottery L = [O2, (u, 1 − u)] is preferred or
indifferent to reference lottery L′ = [O2, (u′, 1− u′)] if and only if u ≥ u′.
As O1 ∼ O˜1 = [O, (u1, 1 − u1)] and Or ∼ O˜r = [O, (ur, 1 − ur)], Assumptions 2.4 and
2.6 imply that u1 = 1 and ur = 0. Also, from O1 % O2 % · · · % Or, we can deduce that
1 = u1 ≥ u2 ≥ · · · ≥ ur = 0.
Assumptions 2.1–2.6 allow us to define the utility of a lottery as the probability of the
best outcome O1 in an indifferent reference lottery, and this utility function for lotteries on
O is linear. This is stated by the following theorem.
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Figure 3: Reducing a lottery to an indifferent compound lottery and then to an indifferent reference lottery
Theorem 2.2 ([37]). If the preference relation % on L satisfies Assumptions 2.1–2.6, then
there are numbers ui associated with outcomes Oi for i = 1, . . . , r, such that for any two
lotteries L = [O,p], and L′ = [O,p′], L % L′ if and only if
r∑
i=1
pi ui ≥
r∑
i=1
p′i ui. (4)
Thus, we can define the utility of lottery L = [O,p] as u(L) =
∑r
i=1 pi ui, where ui = u(Oi).
Also, such a linear utility function is unique up to a strictly increasing affine transformation,
i.e., if u′i = a ui+b, where a > 0 and b are real constants, then u(L) =
∑r
i=1 pi u
′
i also qualifies
as a utility function.
3. Basic Definitions in the D-S Belief Function Theory
In this section, we review the basic definitions in the D-S theory of belief functions. Like
various uncertainty theories, D-S belief function theory includes functional representations
of uncertain knowledge, and basic operations for making inferences from such knowledge.
These will be recalled, respectively, in Section 3.1 and 3.2. Conditional belief functions and
the notion of conditional embedding are then introduced in Section 3.3, and the semantics
of belief functions in D-S theory is discussed in Section 3.4. Most of the material in this
section (except Section 3.4) is taken from [36]. For further details, the reader is referred to
[39] and to [8] for a recent review.
3.1. Representations of belief functions
Belief functions can be represented in several different ways, including as basic probability
assignments, plausibility functions and belief functions3. These are briefly discussed below.
3 Belief functions can also be mathematically represented by a convex set of PMFs called a credal set, but
the semantics of such a representation are incompatible with Dempster’s combination rule [40, 42, 43, 27].
For these reasons, we skip a credal set representation of a belief function.
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Definition 1 (Basic Probability Assignment). Suppose X is an unknown quantity (variable)
with possible values (states) in a finite set ΩX called the state space of X. We assume that
X takes one and only one value in ΩX , but this value is unknown. Let 2
ΩX denote the
set of all subsets of ΩX . A basic probability assignment (BPA) mX for X is a function
mX : 2
ΩX → [0, 1] such that ∑
a⊆ΩX
mX(a) = 1, and mX(∅) = 0. (5)
The subsets a ⊆ ΩX such that mX(a) > 0 are called focal sets of mX . An example of a
BPA for X is the vacuous BPA for X, denoted by ιX , such that ιX(ΩX) = 1. We say that
mX is deterministic if mX has a single focal set (with mass 1). Thus, the vacuous BPA for
X is deterministic with focal set ΩX . If all focal sets of mX are singleton subsets (of ΩX),
then we say that mX is Bayesian. In this case, mX is equivalent to the PMF PX for X such
that PX(x) = mX({x}) for each x ∈ ΩX .
Definition 2 (Plausibility Function). The information in a BPA mX can be represented by
a corresponding plausibility function PlmX defined as follows:
PlmX (a) =
∑
{b⊆ΩX |b∩a6=∅}
mX(b) for all a ⊆ ΩX . (6)
For an example, suppose ΩX = {x, x¯}. Then, the plausibility function PlιX corresponding
to BPA ιX is given by PlιX (∅) = 0, PlιX ({x}) = 1, PlιX ({x¯}) = 1, and PlιX (ΩX) = 1.
Definition 3 (Belief Function). The information in a BPA mX can also be represented by
a corresponding belief function BelmX that is defined as follows:
BelmX (a) =
∑
{b⊆ΩX |b⊆a}
mX(b) for all a ⊆ ΩX . (7)
For the example above with ΩX = {x, x¯}, the belief function BelιX corresponding to
BPA ιX is given by BelιX (∅) = 0, BelιX ({x}) = 0, BelιX ({x¯}) = 0, and BelιX (ΩX) = 1.
For any proposition a ∈ 2ΩX , it is easy to see that BelmX (a) ≤ PlmX (a). Thus, if a DM’s
belief in proposition a is an interval, say [p, p + q], where p, q ≥ 0 and p + q ≤ 1, then such
beliefs can be represented by a BPA mX such that mX(a) = p, mX(ΩX \a) = 1− p− q, and
mX(ΩX) = q. For such a BPA, BelmX (a) = p ≤ p+ q = PlmX (a).
All three representations—BPA, belief and plausibility functions—have exactly the same
information, as any one of them allows us to recover the other two [39].
Next, we describe the two main operations for making inferences.
3.2. Basic operations in the D-S theory
There are two main operations in the D-S theory—Dempster’s combination rule and
marginalization.
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Dempster’s Combination Rule. In the D-S theory, we can combine two BPAs m1 and m2
representing distinct pieces of evidence by Dempster’s rule [5] and obtain the BPA m1 ⊕
m2, which represents the combined evidence. Dempster refers to this rule as the product-
intersection rule, as the product of the BPA values are assigned to the intersection of the
focal sets, followed by normalization. Normalization consists of discarding the mass assigned
to ∅, and normalizing the remaining values so that they add to 1. In general, Dempster’s
rule of combination can be used to combine two BPAs for arbitrary sets of variables.
Let X denote a finite set of variables. The state space of X is×X∈X ΩX . Thus, ifX = {X, Y } then the state space of {X, Y } is ΩX × ΩY . Projection of states simply means
dropping extra coordinates; for example, if (x, y) is a state of {X, Y }, then the projection
of (x, y) to X, denoted by (x, y)↓X , is simply x, which is a state of X. Projection of subsets
of states is achieved by projecting every state in the subset. Suppose b ∈ 2Ω{X,Y } . Then
b↓X = {x ∈ ΩX : (x, y) ∈ b}. Notice that b↓X ∈ 2ΩX .
Vacuous extension of a subset of states of X1 to a subset of states of X2, where X2 ⊇ X1,
is a cylinder set extension, i.e., if a ∈ 2X1 , then a↑X2 = a × ΩX2\X1 . Thus, if a ∈ 2ΩX , then
a↑{X,Y } = a× ΩY .
Definition 4 (Dempster’s rule using BPAs). Suppose m1 and m2 are BPAs for X1 and X2,
respectively. Then m1 ⊕m2 is a BPA for X1 ∪X2 = X , say, given by (m1 ⊕m2)(∅) = 0 and
(m1 ⊕m2)(a) = K−1
∑
{b1,b2⊆ΩX |b1∩b2=a}
m1(b
↓X1
1 )m2(b
↓X2
2 ), (8)
for all a ⊆ ΩX , where K is a normalization constant given by
K = 1−
∑
{b1,b2⊆ΩX |b1∩b2=∅}
m1(b
↓X1
1 )m2(b
↓X2
2 ). (9)
The definition of Dempster’s rule assumes that the normalization constant K is non-
zero. If K = 0, then the two BPAs m1 and m2 are said to be in total conflict and cannot be
combined. If K = 1, we say m1 and m2 are non-conflicting.
Marginalization. Marginalization in D-S theory is addition of values of BPAs.
Definition 5 (Marginalization). Suppose m is a BPA for X . Then, the marginal of m for
X1, where X1 ⊂ X , denoted by m↓X1, is a BPA for X1 such that for each a ⊆ ΩX1,
m↓X1(a) =
∑
{b⊆ΩX |b↓X1= a}
m(b). (10)
3.3. Conditional belief functions
In probability theory, it is common to construct joint PMFs for a set of discrete variables
by using conditional probability distributions. For example, we can construct joint PMF for
(X, Y ) by first assessing PMF PX of X, and conditional PMFs PY |x for each x ∈ ΩX such
that PX(x) > 0. The pointwise multiplication of PY |x for all x ∈ ΩX is called a CPT, and
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denoted by PY |X . Then, PX,Y = PX ⊗ PY |X . We can construct joint BPA for {X, Y } in a
similar manner.
Suppose that there is a BPA for Y expressing our belief about Y if we know that X = x,
and denote it by mY |x. Notice that mY |x : 2ΩY → [0, 1] is such that
∑
b∈2ΩY mY |x(b) = 1.
We can embed this conditional BPA for Y into a BPA for {X, Y }, which is denoted by mx,Y ,
such that the following three conditions hold. First, mx,Y tells us nothing about X, i.e.,
m↓Xx,Y (ΩX) = 1. Second, mx,Y tells us nothing about Y , i.e., m
↓Y
x,Y (ΩY ) = 1. Third, if we
combinemx,Y with the deterministic BPAmX=x forX suchmX=x({x}) = 1 using Dempster’s
rule, and marginalize the result to Y we obtain mY |x, i.e., (mx,Y ⊕mX=x)↓Y = mY |x. The
least committed way to obtain such an embedding, called conditional embedding, was derived
by Smets [46, 47] (see also [41]). It consists of taking each focal set b ∈ 2ΩY of mY |x,
and converting it to a corresponding focal set of mx,Y (with the same mass) as follows:
({x} × b) ∪ ({x} × ΩY ), where {x} denotes the complement of {x} in ΩX . It is easy to
confirm that this method of embedding satisfies the three conditions mentioned above, and
mx,Y is the least committed (minimally informative) BPA verifying this property.
Example 1 (Conditional embedding). Consider discrete variables X and Y , with ΩX =
{x, x¯} and ΩY = {y, y¯}. Suppose that mX is a BPA for X such that mX(x) > 0. If we have
a conditional BPA mY |x for Y given X = x as follows:
mY |x(y) = 0.8, and
mY |x(ΩY ) = 0.2, (11)
then its conditional embedding into BPA mx,Y for {X, Y } is
mx,Y ({(x, y), (x¯, y), (x¯, y¯)}) = 0.8, and
mx,Y (Ω{X,Y }) = 0.2. (12)
There are some differences with conditional probability distributions. First, in probability
theory, PY |X consists of all conditional distributions PY |x that are well-defined, i.e., for all x ∈
ΩX such that PX(x) > 0. In D-S belief function theory, we do not have similar constraints.
We can include only those non-vacuous conditionals mY |x such that mX({x}) > 0. Also, if
we have more than one conditional BPA for Y , given, say for X = x1, and X = x2 (assuming
mX({x1}) > 0, and mX({x2}) > 0), we embed these two conditionals for Y to get BPAs
mx1,Y and mx2,Y for {X, Y }, and then combine them using Dempster’s rule of combination to
obtain one conditional BPA mY |X = mx1,Y ⊕mx2,Y , which corresponds to PY |X in probability
theory.
Second, given any joint PMF PX,Y for {X, Y }, we can always factor this into P ↓XX,Y = PX
for X, and PY |X for {X, Y }, such that PX,Y = PX ⊗ PY |X . This is not true in D-S belief
function theory. Given a joint BPA mX,Y for {X, Y }, we cannot always find a BPA mY |X
for {X, Y } such that mX,Y = m↓XX,Y ⊕mY |X . However, we can always construct joint BPA
mX,Y for {X, Y } by first assessing mX for X, and assessing conditionals mY |xi for Y for those
xi that we have knowledge about and such that mX({xi}) > 0, embed these conditionals
into BPAs for {X, Y }, and combine all such BPAs to obtain the BPA mY |X for {X, Y }. An
implicit assumption here is that BBAs mxi,Y are distinct, and it is acceptable to combine
them using Dempster’s rule. We can then construct mX,Y = mX ⊕mY |X .
9
3.4. Semantics of D-S belief function
In D-S theory, belief functions are representations of an agent’s state of knowledge based
on some evidence. As explained by Shafer [40], such representations can be constructed by
comparing the available evidence with a hypothetical situation in which we receive a coded
message, the meaning of which is random. More precisely, assume that a source sends us
an encrypted message using a code selected at random from a set of codes C = {c1, . . . , cn}
with known probabilities p1, . . . , pn. If we decode the message with code ci, we get a decoded
message of the form “X ∈ Γ(ci)”, where Γ is a multi-valued mapping from C to 2ΩX . For
any nonempty subset a of ΩX , the probability that the meaning of the original message is
“X ∈ a” is
m(a) =
n∑
i=1
piI(Γ(ci) = a),
where I(·) is the indicator function. The random message metaphor thus provides a way
to construct BPAs m. The fundamental assumption of D-S theory is that such metaphors
provide a scale of canonical examples to which any piece of evidence (or, at least, most pieces
of evidence encountered in practice) can be meaningfully compared.
The random set metaphor accounts for the use of Dempster’s rule, which can be easily
derived from the assumption that the two BPAs m1 and m2 are induced by stochastically
independent randomly coded messages. Two bodies of evidence are considered as indepen-
dent if “(they) are sufficiently unrelated that pooling them is like pooling stochastically
independent randomly coded messages” [40, Section 5.1].
In D-S theory, any belief function can thus be thought of as being induced by a multi-
valued mapping from a probability space to the power set of the frame of discernment.
Such multi-valued mappings were already explicitly constructed from a statistical model in
Dempster’s original application of belief functions to statistical inference [5]. A statistical
model is no more “real” than a random code canonical examples: both are idealizations that
allow us to formalize our knowledge and make inferences based on reasonable assumptions.
4. A Utility Theory for D-S Belief Function Theory
In this section, we describe a new utility theory for lotteries where the uncertainty is
described by D-S belief functions. These lotteries, called belief function lotteries4, will be
introduced in Section 4.1. We present and discuss assumptions in Section 4.2 and state a
representation theorem in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we show that an additional assumption
leads to a simpler model and we state the corresponding representation theorem. Finally, in
Section 4.5, we describe an even simpler practical model allowing us to assess the utility of
a belief function lottery based on a limited number of parameters.
4.1. Belief function lotteries
We generalize the decision framework outlined in Section 2 by assuming that uncertainty
about the state of nature X is described by a BPA mX for X. The probabilistic framework
is recovered as a special case when mX is Bayesian. The BPA mX is assumed to be given,
4This notion was previously introduced in [7] under the name “evidential lottery.”
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and is assumed to be a meaningful representation of the DM’s state of knowledge about X
at a given time, with the semantics described in Section 3.4. As before, we define an act as
a mapping f from ΩX to the set O of outcomes. Mapping f pushes mX forward from ΩX
to O, transferring each mass mX(a) for a ∈ 2ΩX to the image of subset a by f , denoted as
f [a] = {f(x) : x ∈ a}. The resulting BPA m for O is then defined as
m(b) =
∑
{a∈2ΩX |f [a]=b}
mX(a), (13)
for all b ⊆ O [8]. Eq. (13) clearly generalizes Eq. (1). The pair [O,m] will be called a belief
function (bf) lottery. It is a representation of the DM’s subjective beliefs about the outcome
that will obtain as a result of selecting act f . As noted in [7], a bf lottery can also arise
from a BPA mX on ΩX and a nondeterministic act f , defined as mapping from ΩX to 2
O.
This formalism may be useful to account for under-specified decision problems in which, for
instance, the set of acts or the state space ΩX are too coarsely defined to allow for a precise
description of the consequences of an act [19].
As before, we assume that two acts can be compared from what we believe their outcomes
will be, irrespective of the evidence on which we base our beliefs. This assumption is a form
of what Wakker [52] calls the principle of complete ignorance (PCI). It implies that two
acts resulting in the same bf lottery are equivalent. The problem of expressing preferences
between acts becomes that of expressing preferences between bf lotteries.
Remark 1. As a consequence of the PCI, preferences between acts do not depend on the
cardinality of the state space ΩX in case of complete ignorance. For instance, assume that
we define ΩX = {x1, x2}, and we are completely ignorant of the state of nature, so that our
belief state is described by the vacuous BPA mX(ΩX) = 1. Consider two acts f1 and f2 that
yield $100 if, respectively, x1 or x2 occurs, and $0 otherwise. These two acts induce the
same vacuous bf lottery m(O) = 1 with O = {$100, $0}: consequently, they are equivalent
according to the PCI. Now, assume that we decide to express the states of nature with finer
granularity and we refine state x1 into two states x11 and x12. Let ΩX′ = {x11, x12, x2} denote
the refined frame. We still have mX′(ΩX′) = 1 and m(O) = 1, so that our preferences
between acts f1 and f2 are unchanged. We note that a Bayesian DM applying Laplace’s
principle of indifference (PI) would reach a different conclusion: before the refinement, the PI
implies pX(x1) = pX(x2) = 1/2, which results in the same probabilistic lottery p = (1/2, 1/2)
on O = {$100, $0} for the two acts, but after the refinement the same principle gives us
pX(x11) = pX(x12) = pX(x2) = 1/3; this results in two different lotteries p1 = (2/3, 1/3) for
act f1 and p2 = (1/3, 2/3) for act f2, which makes f1 strictly preferable to f2. Considering
that the granularity of the state space is often partly arbitrary (as discussed by Shafer in [39]),
we regard this property of invariance to refinement under complete ignorance as a valuable
feature of a decision theory based on D-S belief functions.
We are thus concerned with a DM who has preferences on Lbf , the set of all bf lotteries.
Our task is to find a utility function u : Lbf → [R], where [R] denotes the set of closed real
intervals, such that the u(L) = [u, 1 − v] is viewed as an interval-valued utility of L. The
interval-valued utility can be interpreted as follows: u and v are, respectively, the degrees of
belief of receiving the best and the worst outcome in a bf reference lottery equivalent to L
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(and 1− v is, consequently, the degree of plausibility of receiving the best outcome). Given
two lotteries L and L′, L is preferred to L′ if and only if u ≥ u′ and v ≤ v′. This leads to
incomplete preferences on the set of all bf lotteries. If we assume u = 1−v for all bf lotteries,
then we have a real-valued utility function on Lbf , and consequently, complete preferences.
Example 2 (Ellsberg’s Urn). Ellsberg [15] describes a decision problem that questions the
adequacy of the vN-M axiomatic framework. Suppose we have an urn with 90 balls, of which
30 are red, and the remaining 60 are either black or yellow. We draw a ball at random
from the urn. Let X denote the color of the ball drawn, with ΩX = {r, b, y}. Notice that
the uncertainty of X can be described by a BPA mX for X such that mX({r}) = 1/3, and
mX({b, y}) = 2/3.
First, we are offered a choice between Lottery L1: $100 on red, and Lottery L2: $100
on black, i.e., in L1, you get $100 if the ball drawn is red, and $0 if the ball drawn is black
or yellow, and in L2, you get $100 if the ball drawn is black and $0 if the ball drawn is
red or yellow. Choice of L1 can be denoted by alternative f1 : ΩX → {$100, $0} such that
f1(r) = $100, f1(b) = f1(y) = $0. Similarly, choice of L2 can be denoted by alternative
f2 : ΩX → {$100, $0} such that f2(b) = $100, f2(r) = f2(y) = $0. L1 can be represented
by the BPA m1 for O = {$0, $100} as follows: m1({$100}) = 1/3, m1({$0}) = 2/3. L2
can be represented by BPA m2 for O as follows: m2({$0}) = 1/3, m2({$0, $100}) = 2/3.
Notice that L1 and L2 are bf lotteries. Ellsberg notes that a frequent pattern of response is
L1 preferred to L2.
Second, we are offered a choice between L3: $100 on red or yellow, and L4: $100 on
black or yellow, i.e., in L3 you get $100 if the ball drawn is red or yellow, and $0 if the
ball drawn is black, and in L4, you get $100 if the ball drawn is black or yellow, and $0 if
the ball drawn is red. L3 can be represented by BPA m3 as follows: m3({$100}) = 1/3, and
m3({$0, $100}) = 2/3, and L4 can be represented by the BPA m4 as follows: m4({$0}) = 1/3,
m4({$100}) = 2/3. L3 and L4 are also belief function lotteries. Ellsberg notes that L4 is
often strictly preferred to L3. Also, the same subjects who prefer L1 to L2, prefer L4 to L3.
Table 1 is a summary of the four bf lotteries.
Thus, if the outcomes of a lottery are based on the states of a random variable X, which
is described by a BPA mX for X, then we have a belief function lottery. In this example,
we have only two outcomes, $100, and $0. L1 and L4 can also be regarded as probabilistic
lotteries as the corresponding BPAs are Bayesian. L2 and L3 have BPAs with non-singleton
focal sets. Thus, these two lotteries can be considered as involving “ambiguity” as the exact
distribution of the probability (of 2/3) between outcomes $100 and $0 is unknown. Regardless
of how the probability of 2/3 is distributed between b and y, the preferences of subjects violate
the tenets of vN-M utility theory.
4.2. Assumptions of our framework
As in the probabilistic case, we will assume that a DM’s preferences for bf lotteries are
reflexive and transitive. However, unlike the probabilistic case (Assumption 2.4), we do not
assume that these preferences are complete. In the probabilistic case, incomplete preferences
are studied in [1], and in the case of sets of utility functions, in [13].
Our first assumption is identical to Assumption 2.1.
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Table 1: Four belief function lotteries in Example 2
Lottery mi({$100}) mi({$0}) mi({$100, $0})
L1 ($100 on r) 1/3 2/3
L2 ($100 on b) 1/3 2/3
L3 ($100 on r or y) 1/3 2/3
L4 ($100 on b or y) 2/3 1/3
Assumption 4.1 (Weak ordering of outcomes). The DM’s preferences % for outcomes in
O = {O1, . . . , Or} are complete and transitive.
This allows us to label the outcomes such that
O1 % O2 % · · · % Or, and O1  Or. (14)
Let Lbf denote the set of all bf lotteries on O = {O1, . . . Or}, where the outcomes satisfy
Eq. (14). As every BPA m on O is a bf lottery, Lbf is essentially the set of all BPAs on
O. As the set of all BPAs include Bayesian BPAs, the set Lbf is a superset of L, i.e., every
probabilistic lottery on O can be considered a bf lottery.
Consider a compound lottery [L,m], where L = {L1, . . . , Ls}, m is a BPA for L, and
Lj = [O,mj|Lj ] is a bf lottery on O, where mj|Lj is a conditional BPA for O in the second
stage given that lottery Lj is realized in the first stage. We thus have s + 1 pieces of
evidence represented by BPAs m and m1|L1 , . . . ,ms|Ls . Assuming these pieces of evidence to
be independent, they can be combined by Dempster’s rule (8), after conditionally embedding
the conditional BPAs mj|Lj (see Section 3.3). Marginalizing the orthogonal sum on O, we get
a BPA m′. Assumption 4.2 below posits that the resulting simple lottery [O,m′] is equally
preferred to the original compound lottery [L,m], i.e., we can reduce the compound lottery
to a simple bf lottery on O using the D-S calculus.
Assumption 4.2 (Reduction of compound lotteries). Suppose [L,m] is a compound lottery
as described in the previous paragraph. Then, [L,m] ∼ [O,m′], where
m′ =
(
m⊕
(
s⊕
j=1
mLj ,j
))↓O
, (15)
and mLj ,j is a BPA for (L,O) obtained from mj|Lj by conditional embedding, for j = 1, . . . , s.
Example 3. Consider two urns: Urn 1 contains 90 balls, 30 of which are black, and 60 are
red or yellow. Urn 2 is identical to Ellsberg’s urn in Example 2: it contains 90 balls, 30 of
which are red, and 60 are black or yellow. Assume that, in the first stage, you are allowed
to draw one ball B1 from Urn 1:
• If B1 is black or red, then you will be allowed to draw one ball from Urn 2 in the second
stage, and you will get $100 if it is red, and $0 otherwise (lottery L1 of Example 2);
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Figure 4: A 2-stage compound belief function lottery. B1 is drawn from Urn 1, and B2 is drawn from Urn 2.
The corresponding BPAs are shown on the right. In the first stage, m is a BPA for {L1, L2}. In the second
stage, m1|L1 and m2|L2 are BPAs for {$100, $0}.
• If B1 is yellow, you will be allowed to draw one ball from Urn 2, and you will get $100
if it is black, and $0 otherwise (lottery L2 of Example 2).
Here, we have a compound bf lottery with outcome space L = {L1, L2}. We get L1 or L2
depending on the color X1 of ball B1 drawn from Urn 1. We have mX1({b}) = 1/3 and
mX1({r, y}) = 2/3, and the act f defined by f(b) = f(r) = L1, f(y) = L2. The BPA on
L is, thus, m({L1}) = 1/3 and m({L1, L2}) = 2/3. Now, L1 and L2 are bf lotteries on
O = {$100, $0}, with BPAs
m1|L1({$100}) = 1/3, m1|L1({$0}) = 2/3
and
m2|L2({$0}) = 1/3, m2|L2({$0, $100}) = 2/3.
Here, mj|Lj is a conditional BPA on O, given that Lj is obtained in the first stage (see Figure
4). The conditional embeddings of m1|L1 and m2|L2 are BPAs on L ×O equal, respectively,
to
mL1,1({(L1, $100), (L2, $100), (L2, $0)}) = 1/3,
mL1,1({(L1, $0), (L2, $100), (L2, $0)}) = 2/3,
and
mL2,2({(L2, $0), (L1, $100), (L1, $0)}) = 1/3,
mL2,2(L×O) = 2/3,
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Their orthogonal sum is
(mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $100), (L2, $0)}) = 1/9,
(mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $0), (L2, $0)}) = 2/9,
(mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $100), (L2, $100), (L2, $0)}) = 2/9,
(mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $0), (L2, $100), (L2, $0)}) = 4/9.
Combining it with m, we get
(m⊕mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $100)}) = 3/27,
(m⊕mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $0)}) = 6/27,
(m⊕mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $100), (L2, $0)}) = 2/27,
(m⊕mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $0), (L2, $0)}) = 4/27,
(m⊕mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $100), (L2, $100), (L2, $0)}) = 4/27,
(m⊕mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)({(L1, $0), (L2, $100), (L2, $0)}) = 8/27.
Marginalizing on O, we get m′ = (m⊕mL1,1 ⊕mL2,2)↓O equal to
m′({$100}) = 3/27 = 1/9,
m′({$0}) = 10/27,
m′({$100, $0}) = 14/27.
According to Assumption 4.2, a rational DM should be indifferent between receiving the com-
pound bf lottery [L,m], or receiving the bf lottery [O,m′], i.e., a prize about which the only
information he has is given by a randomly coded message whose meaning can be “The value
of the prize is $100” with probability 1/9, “The value of the prize is $0” with probability
10/27, and “The value of the prize is unknown” with probability 14/27.
The following proposition states that Assumption 4.2 generalizes Assumption 2.2.
Proposition 1. Let L = {L1, . . . , Ls} be a set of bf lotteries, with Lj = [O,mj|Lj ], in which
mj|Lj is a Bayesian conditional BPA for O such that mj|Lj({Oi}) = p(j)i and
∑r
i=1 p
(j)
i = 1
for j = 1, . . . , s. Let [L,m] be a compound lottery in which m is a Bayesian BPA for L
such that m({Lj} = qj for j = 1, . . . , s with
∑s
j=1 qj = 1. Then BPA m
′ defined by (15) is
Bayesian and it verifies
m′({Oi}) =
s∑
j=1
qjp
(j)
i (16)
for i = 1, . . . , r.
Proof. The conditional embedding of mj|Lj is given by
mLj ,j
(
{(Lj, Oi)} ∪ {Lj} ×O
)
= p
(j)
i , i = 1, . . . , r.
Let m0 =
⊕s
j=1mLj ,j. It is a BPA for L×O defined by
m0 ({(L1, Oi1), . . . , (Ls, Ois)}) = p(1)i1 . . . p(s)is
15
for all (i1, . . . , is) ∈ {1, . . . , r}s. Combining m0 with m, we get a Bayesian BPA m′0 on L×O
such that
m′0({(Lj, Oi)}) = qjp(j)i .
After marginalizing on O, we finally get Eq. (16).
Next, we define a bf reference lottery [O2,m] as a bf lottery on O2 = {O1, Or}. A bf
reference lottery has three parameters u = m({O1}), v = m({Or}), and w = m(O2), which
are all non-negative and sum to 1. It can be equivalently denoted as [O2, (u, v, w)]. The
first and second elements of the triple are, respectively, the degrees of belief of receiving
the best and worst outcomes, while the third element can be seen as a degree of ignorance.
Obviously, the degrees of plausibility of receiving the best and the worst outcomes are,
respectively, 1 − v and 1 − u. The following assumption states that any deterministic bf
lottery is equally preferred to some bf reference lottery.
Assumption 4.3 (Continuity). Any subset of outcomes a ⊆ O (considered as a deter-
ministic bf lottery) is indifferent to a bf reference lottery a˜ = [O2, (ua, va, wa)] for some
ua, va, wa ≥ 0 such that ua + va + wa = 1. Furthermore, wa = 0 if a = {Oi} is a singleton
subset.
For singleton subsets, the equivalent bf reference lottery is Bayesian: this ensures that As-
sumption 4.3 is a generalization of Assumption 2.3. For non-singleton subsets a of outcomes,
we may have wa > 0, i.e., the bf reference lottery may not be Bayesian. In other words,
we do not assume that ambiguity can be resolved by selecting an equivalent probabilistic
reference lottery.
Example 4. Consider lottery L2 = [{$100, $0},m2] in Example 2, where m2({$0}) = 1/3,
and m2({$100, $0}) = 2/3. Suppose we wish to assess the utility of focal set {$100, $0}
using a probabilistic reference lottery [{$100, $0}, (p, 1 − p)]. A DM may have the following
preferences. For any p ≤ 0.2 she prefers {$100, $0} to the probabilistic reference lottery, and
for any p ≥ 0.3, she prefers the probabilistic reference lottery to {$100, $0}. However, she is
unable to give us a precise p such that {$100, $0} ∼ [{$100, $0], (p, 1− p)]. For such a DM,
we can assess a bf reference lottery [{$100, $0}, (0.2, 0.7, 0.1)] such that Belma({$100}) = 0.2
and Plma({$100}) = 0.3.
Assumption 4.4 (Quasi-order). The preference relation % for bf lotteries on Lbf is a quasi-
order, i.e., it is reflexive and transitive.
In contrast with the probabilistic case (Assumption 2.4), we do not assume that % is
complete. There are many reasons we may not wish to assume completeness. It is not
descriptive of human behavior. Even from a normative point of view, it is questionable
that a DM has complete preferences on all possible lotteries. The assumption of incomplete
preferences is consistent with the D-S theory of belief functions where we have non-singleton
focal sets. Several authors, such as Aumann [1], and Dubra et al. [13] argue why the
assumption of complete preferences may not be realistic in many circumstances.
The substitutability assumption is similar to the probabilistic case (Assumption 2.5)– we
replace an outcome in the probabilistic case by a focal set of m in the bf case.
16
Assumption 4.5 (Substitutability). In any bf lottery L = [O,m], if we substitute a focal
set a of m by an equally preferred bf reference lottery a˜ = [O2,ma], then the result is a
compound lottery that is equally preferred to L.
It follows from Assumptions 4.1–4.5 that given any bf lottery, we can reduce it to an
equally preferred bf reference lottery. This is stated as Theorem 4.1 below.
Theorem 4.1 (Reducing a bf lottery to an indifferent bf reference lottery). Under As-
sumptions 4.1–4.5, any bf lottery L = [O,m] with focal sets a1, . . . ,ak is indifferent to a bf
reference lottery L˜ = [O2, m˜], such that
m˜({O1}) =
k∑
i=1
m(ai)uai , (17a)
m˜({Or}) =
k∑
i=1
m(ai) vai , and (17b)
m˜(O2) =
k∑
i=1
m(ai)wai , (17c)
where uai, vai and wai are the masses assigned, respectively, to {O1}, {Or} and O2 by the bf
reference lottery a˜i equivalent to ai.
Proof. From Assumption 4.3 (continuity), we can replace each focal set ai of m one at a
time by an indifferent bf reference lottery a˜i = [O2,mi|a˜i ], yielding a sequence of compound
lotteries. From Assumptions 4.5 (substitutability) and 4.4 (quasi-order), these compound
lotteries are all indifferent to L (see Figure 5). Let L′ = [L,m′] be the compound lottery
obtained after all focal sets ai have been substituted, with m′({a˜i}) = m(ai). From As-
sumption 4.2 (reduction of compound lotteries), L′ can be reduced to a reference bf lottery
L˜ = [O2, m˜], by considering each BBA mi|a˜i as a conditional BPA and applying the rules of
D-S calculus. The reduced bf lottery L˜ = [O2, m˜] is then given by
m˜ =
(
m′ ⊕
(
k⊕
i=1
ma˜,i
))↓O2
,
where ma˜,i is the BPA for O2 obtained from mi|a˜i by conditional embedding. If we have
mi|a˜i({O1}) = uai , mi|a˜i({Or}) = vai and mi|a˜i(O2) = wai , then after conditional embedding
BPA ma˜i,i is as follows:
ma˜i,i({(a˜i, O1)} ∪ ({a˜i} ×O2)) = uai
ma˜i,i({(a˜i, Or)} ∪ ({a˜i} ×O2)) = vai
ma˜i,i(L×O2) = wai .
Let m0 denote
⊕k
i=1ma˜i,i. The focal sets of m0 are of the form
a(I1,I2,I3) =
(⋃
i∈I1
a˜i × {O1}
)
∪
(⋃
i∈I2
a˜i × {Or}
)
∪
(⋃
i∈I3
Li ×O2
)
,
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Figure 5: Reducing a bf lottery to a bf reference lottery
for all partitions (I1, I2, I3) of {1, . . . , k}, and the corresponding value of m0 is:
m0(a(I1,I2,I3)) =
(∏
i∈I1
uai
)(∏
i∈I2
vai
)(∏
i∈I3
wai
)
.
Next, we combine Bayesian BPA m′ for L with m0. The focal sets of m′ ⊕ m0 are of the
form {a˜i} × {O1}, {a˜i} × {Or}, and {a˜i} × O2 depending on whether i ∈ I1 or i ∈ I2, or
i ∈ I3, respectively, with mass m(ai)m0(a(I1,I2,I3)). Finally we marginalize m′ ⊕m0 to O2.
The mass assigned to each focal set {a˜i}×{O1} is maiuai . Thus, m˜({O1}) =
∑k
i=im(ai)uai .
Similarly, m˜({Or}) =
∑k
i=im(ai)vai , and m˜(O2) =
∑k
i=im(ai)wai .
Next, we formulate a monotonicity assumption to generalize Assumption 2.6. Given two
bf reference lotteries, if any of them assigns a higher degree of belief to the best outcome
O1 and a lower degree of belief to the worst outcome Or (or, equivalently, higher degrees of
belief and plausibility to O1), then it should arguably be preferred. If this is not the case,
i.e., if the best and the worst outcomes both have a higher degree of belief for one lottery (or,
equivalently, if the belief-plausibility intervals for O1 in the two lotteries are strictly nested),
then there does not seem to be any solid ground for preference, and the two lotteries can be
considered as incomparable. This line of reasoning is formalized in Assumption 4.6 below.
Assumption 4.6 (Monotonicity). Suppose L = [O2, (u, v, w)] and L
′ = [O2, (u′, v′, w′)] are
bf reference lotteries. Then, L % L′ if and only if u ≥ u′ and 1− v ≥ 1− v′.
It is clear that % as defined in Assumption 4.6 is reflexive and transitive. The corre-
sponding indifference relation is L ∼ L′ if and only if u = u′ and v = v′, i.e., if and only if
L = L′. Also, the preference relation % on the set of all bf reference lotteries is obviously
incomplete: two lotteries L and L′ are incomparable if not L % L′ and not L′ % L, i.e., if
the intervals [u, 1− v] and [u′, 1− v′] are strictly nested.
The preference relation defined in Assumption 4.6 can equivalently be expressed as L % L′
if and only if Belm({O1}) ≥ Belm′({O1}) and Plm({O1}) ≥ Plm′({O1}) (meaning that the
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best outcome O1 is deemed both more credible and more plausible under L than it is if under
L′).
We note that a stronger notion of preference would be to prefer L over L′ if and only if
Belm({O1}) ≥ Plm′({O1}), i.e., if and only if u ≥ 1−v′. This alternative preference relation
is arguably too strict, which would lead to a more incomplete preference order on lotteries.
To conclude this section, we note that Assumptions 4.1, 4.3 and 4.6 imply the following
consistency constraints between the reference bf lotteries equivalent to single outcomes:
1 = u{O1} ≥ u{O2} ≥ . . . ≥ u{Or} = 0. (18)
4.3. Representation theorem
Theorem 4.2 (Interval-valued utility function). Suppose L = [O,m] and L′ = [O,m′] are
bf lotteries on O. If the preference relation % on Lbf satisfies Assumptions 4.1–4.6, then
there are intervals [ua, 1 − va] associated with nonempty subsets a ⊆ O such that L % L′ if
and only if ∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)ua ≥
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m′(a)ua (19a)
and ∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a) va ≤
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m′(a) va. (19b)
Thus, for a bf lottery L = [O,m], we can define
[u](L) = [u, 1− v] (20)
as an interval-valued utility of L, with
u =
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)uai and v =
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a) va. (21)
Also, such a utility function is unique up to a strictly increasing affine transformation,
i.e., if u′ = a u+ b, and v′ = a v + b, where a > 0, and b are real constants, then
[u′](L) = [u′, 1− v′]
also qualifies as an interval-valued utility function.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Theorem 4.1 and Assumption 4.6 (monotonicity).
A special case of Theorem 4.2 is if we use Bayesian bf reference lotteries for the continuity
assumption, i.e., wa = 0 for all focal sets a of m. In this case, Theorem 4.2 implies Corollary
4.1 below where we have a real-valued utility function and a complete ordering on Lbf .
Corollary 4.1 (Real-valued utility function). Suppose L = [O,m] and L′ = [O,m′] are
bf lotteries on O. If the preference relation % on Lbf satisfies Assumptions 4.1–4.6 and if
wa = 0 for all focal sets a of m and m′, then there are numbers ua associated with nonempty
subsets a ⊆ O such that L1 % L2 if and only if∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)ua ≥
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m′(a)ua.
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Thus, for a bf lottery L = [O,m], we can define
u(L) =
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)ua (22)
as the utility of L. Also, such a utility function is unique up to a strictly increasing affine
transformation, i.e., if u′a = a ua + b, where a > 0, and b are real constants, then
u′(L) =
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)u′a
also qualifies as a utility function.
Proof. The result in Corollary 4.1 follows trivially from Theorem 4.2.
The utility function in Eq. (22) has exactly the same form as Jaffray’s linear utility [30].
This is discussed further in Section 5.1.
Next, we illustrate the application of Theorem 4.2 to some examples: Ellsberg’s urn
problem described in Example 2, the one red ball problem described in [35], and the 1,000
balls urns described in [2].
Figure 6: Ellsberg’s urn, choice of lotteries, and the corresponding belief function lotteries
Example 5 (Ellsberg’s urn). Consider the four bf lotteries described in Example 2 (also in
Table 1 and in Figure 6). Given a vacuous bf lottery [{$100, $0}, ι], where ι is the vacuous
BPA on O = {$100, $0}, what is an indifferent bf reference lottery? For an ambiguity-averse
DM,
[{$100, $0}, (1/2, 1/2, 0)]  [{$100, $0}, ι].
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For such a DM, we thus have 1− v{$100, $0} < 1/2.
For the first choice problem between L1 ($100 on r) and L2 ($100 on b), using Eq. (22),
[u](L1) = [1/3, 1/3], and
[u](L2) =
2
3
[
u{$100, $0}, 1− v{$100, $0}
]
.
Thus, an ambiguity-averse DM would choose L1. This result is valid as long as 1−v{$100, $0} <
1/2 and is consistent with Ellsberg’s findings. For the second choice problem between L3 ($100
on r or y), and L4 ($100 on b or y),
[u](L3) =
1
3
(1) +
2
3
[
u{$100, $0}, 1− v{$100, $0}
]
,
and [u](L4) = [2/3, 2/3]. An ambiguity-averse DM would choose L4, as
1
3
+
2
3
(1− v{$100, $0}) < 2
3
as long as 1 − v{$100, $0} < 1/2, a result that is also consistent with Ellsberg’s empirical
findings.
Figure 7: One red ball urn, choices, and the corresponding belief function lotteries
Example 6 (One red ball). Consider the following example called “one red ball” in [35] (see
Figure 7). An urn possibly contains balls of six colors: red (r), blue (b), green (g), orange
(o), white (w), and yellow (y). One ball is drawn at random from the urn. We are informed
that the urn has a total of n balls, where n is a positive integer, and that there is exactly
one red ball in the urn. Suppose random variable X denotes the color of the ball drawn from
the urn. Then ΩX = {r, b, g, o, w, y}, and mX is a BPA for X such that mX({r}) = 1/n,
and mX({b, g, o, w, y}) = (n − 1)/n. First, you choose a color, and then you draw a ball
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at random from the urn. You win $100 if the color of the ball drawn from the urn matches
the color you chose, and you win $0 if it doesn’t. What color do you choose? In [35], the
authors describe some informal experiments where all respondents chose red for n ≤ 7, and
for n ≥ 8, several respondents preferred a color different from red.
Suppose you choose r. The bf lottery Lr based on mX is as follows: [{$100, $0},mr],
where mr({$100}) = 1/n, and mr({$0}) = (n − 1)/n. If the color you pick is b, then the
bf lottery Lb is [{$100, $0},mb], where mb({$0}) = 1/n, and mb({$100, $0}) = (n − 1)/n.
Thus, we have [u](Lr) = [1/n, 1/n], and
[u](Lb) =
n− 1
n
[
u{$100, $0}, 1− v{$100, $0}
]
.
So, Lb is strictly preferred to Lr whenever
n− 1
n
u{$100, $0} >
1
n
,
i.e., whenever u{$100, $0} > 1/(n− 1), and Lr is strictly preferred to Lb whenever
n− 1
n
(
1− v{$100, $0}
)
<
1
n
,
i.e., whenever 1 − v{$100, $0} < 1/(n − 1). Hence, Lb is increasingly preferred to Lr when n
increases, which is consistent with the findings reported in [35]. In our model, when
u{$100, $0} <
1
n− 1 < 1− v{$100, $0},
the two lotteries Lr and Lb are incomparable. If forced to choose, the DM might just choose
arbitrarily. As the experiment reported in [35] did not allow the respondents to express
inability to choose between the two lotteries, it does not provide any evidence for or against
our model.
Example 7 (Urns with 1,000 balls). The following example is discussed in [2], where it is
credited to Ellsberg in an oral conversation (with the authors of [2]). It is also discussed in
[14]. There are two urns, each with 1,000 balls, numbered from 1− 1, 000. Urn 1 has exactly
one ball for each number, and there is no ambiguity. Urn 2 has unknown number of balls of
each number, and there is much ambiguity. One ball is to be chosen at random from an urn
of your choosing. If the number on the ball matches a specific number, e.g., 687, you win
$100, and if not, you win nothing ($0). Which one of the two urns will you choose? This
choice problem is shown in Figure 8.
It is reported in [2] that many respondents chose Urn 2. Why? Urn 1 has only one
ball numbered 687, and therefore, the probability of winning $100 if the choice is Urn 1 is
very small, 0.001. Urn 2 could possibly have anywhere from 0 to 1, 000 balls numbered 687.
Thus, the choice of Urn 2, although ambiguous, is appealing. Let’s analyze this problem using
Theorem 4.2.
Let X1 denote the number on the ball chosen Urn 1, and let X2 denote the number on the
ball chosen Urn 2. ΩX1 = ΩX2 = {1, . . . , 1000}. Function mX1 is a BPA for X1 as follows:
mX1({1}) = . . . = mX1({1000}) = 0.001. BPA mX2 is vacuous, i.e., mX2(ΩX2) = 1.
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Figure 8: Two urns with 1,000 balls, choices, and the corresponding belief function lotteries
Lottery L1 corresponding to choice of Urn 1 (say, alternative f1) is [{$100, $0},m1], where
m1 is a BPA for {$100, $0} such that m1({$100}) = 0.001, and m1({$0}) = 0.999. L1 is a
bf reference lottery, and thus, [u](L1) = [0.001, 0.001]. Lottery L2 corresponding to choice of
Urn 2 (say, alternative f2) is [{$100, $0},m2], where m2 is a vacuous BPA for {$100, $0}.
The utility of L2 is
[u](L2) =
[
u{$100, $0}, 1− v{$100, $0}
]
.
Consequently, L2 is preferred to L1 as long as
u{$100, $0} ≥ 0.001,
a condition that is easily satisfied. This may explain why many DMs appear to be ambiguity-
seeking in this context, i.e., prefer L2 to L1.
4.4. An additional assumption and the corresponding representation theorem
Whereas Theorem 4.2 guarantees the existence of an interval valued utility function for
bf lotteries, there remains the problem of practical elicitation of utilities. The maximum
number of utilities to be elicited increases exponentially with the number r of outcomes. As
the utilities of the worst and the best outcomes are, by construction, 0 and 1, and w{Oi} = 0
for each other single outcome Oi, the actual number of utilities to be elicited is, at most,
2(2r − 1 − r) + r − 2 = 2r+1 − r − 4. By making one more reasonable assumption, we can
drastically limit the number of parameters to be elicited.
Assumption 4.7 below has no counterpart in the vN-M theory, but it is rooted in decision-
making under ignorance [30, 52]. For any nonempty subset of consequences a ⊆ O, let Oa
and Oa denote, respectively, the worst and the best outcome in a. To simplify the notations,
we assimilate a deterministic BPA with its focal set, and we write a % b to mean that the
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Table 2: Acts in Example 8
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
f1 0 1 1000 1000
f2 0 0 999 1000
f ′1 0 1 1 1000
f ′2 0 999 1000 1000
deterministic lottery with focal set a is preferred or indifferent to the deterministic lottery
with focal set b. Then our last assumption can be stated as follows.
Assumption 4.7 (Dominance). For all nonempty subsets a and b of O, if Oa % Ob and
Oa % Ob, then a % b.
Assumption 4.7 implies that the preference between two deterministic lotteries with focal
sets a and b is determined only by the best and worst outcomes in a and b. In particular,
when Oa = Ob and Oa = Ob, then a ∼ b. Although counterintuitive at first glance, this
assumption cannot be avoided if we accept the PCI, i.e., if we accept that any two acts
yielding the same bf lottery are equivalent, as shown by the following example.
Example 8. Assume that the set of outcomes is O = {$0, $1, $999, $1, 000}. According
to Assumption 4.7, a DM would be indifferent between receiving one of the prizes in a =
{$0, $1, $1, 000}, without any further information, and receiving one of the prizes in b =
{$0, $999, $1, 000}. It may be argued that most DMs would strictly prefer b to a. Yet,
assume that the state space is ΩX = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, we are in a state of complete ignorance,
i.e., mX(ΩX) = 1, and the deterministic lotteries a and b are generated by the acts f1 and f2
shown in Table 2. It is clear that f1 dominates f2 (it yields at least as desirable consequences
for all states of nature, and strictly preferred consequences for some states of nature), so
it would be paradoxical to strictly prefer f2 over f1, i.e., to strictly prefer b over a. But a
and b might also have been generated by acts f ′1 and f ′2 in Table 2 and, as f ′2 dominates
f ′1, it would also be paradoxical to strictly prefer f
′
1 over f
′
2, i.e., to strictly prefer a over b.
Consequently, indifference between a and b seems to be the only rational option in this case.
Generalizing Example 8, Jaffray [30] shows that, whenever Oa % Ob and Oa % Ob, we can
always construct a state space ΩX and two acts f1 and f2 such that f1[ΩX ] = a, f2[ΩX ] = b
and, for any ω ∈ ΩX , f1(ω) % f2(ω). As f1 yields at least as desirable outcomes as f2 under
any state of nature, it should be preferred whatever our beliefs on ΩX , and in particular
when mX(ΩX) = 1. Hence, we should have a % b.
Assumption 4.7 implies that a % Oa and Oa % a. From Assumption 4.6, we thus have
ua ≥ uOa and 1− va ≤ uOa . Consequently, the utility bounds ua and 1− va of subset a can
be written as convex combinations of the utilities of its worst and best outcomes:
ua = α(Oa, Oa)uOa +
(
1− α(Oa, Oa)
)
uOa (23a)
1− va = β(Oa, Oa)uOa +
(
1− β(Oa, Oa)
)
uOa , (23b)
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where α(Oa, Oa) and β(Oa, Oa) are two coefficients depending only on the best and worst
outcomes in a, such that 0 ≤ α(Oa, Oa) ≤ β(Oa, Oa) ≤ 1. In Jaffray’s framework [30], wa = 0
(see Section 5.1) and α(Oa, Oa) is called a local pessimism index. In our framework, we can
see the interval
[
α(Oa, Oa), β(Oa, Oa)
]
as an interval-valued local pessimism index reflecting
both the DM’s attitude to ambiguity and indeterminacy. Assumption 4.7 thus brings the
maximum number of parameters to be elicited from 2r+1−r−4 down to r(r−1)+r−2 = r2−2.
The above discussion can be summarized in the form of the following representation theorem
(generalizing Theorem 2 in [30]).
Theorem 4.3 (Interval-valued local pessimism index). Suppose L = [O,m] and L′ = [O,m′]
are bf lotteries on O. If the preference relation % on Lbf satisfies Assumptions 4.1–4.7, then
there are numbers uO associated with outcomes O ∈ O and two mappings α and β from
O = {(O,O′) ∈ O2 : O′ % O}
to [0, 1], with α ≤ β, such that L % L′ if and only if∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)
[
α(Oa, Oa)uOa + (1− α(Oa, Oa))uOa
] ≥
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m′(a)
[
α(Oa, Oa)uOa + (1− α(Oa, Oa))uOa
]
and∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)
[
β(Oa, Oa)uOa + (1− β(Oa, Oa))uOa
] ≥
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m′(a)
[
β(Oa, Oa)uOa + (1− β(Oa, Oa))uOa
]
,
where Oa and Oa are, respectively, the worst and the best outcomes in a ⊆ O. Thus, for a
bf lottery L = [O,m], we can define
[u](L) = [u, 1− v]
as an interval-valued utility of L, with
u =
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)
[
α(Oa, Oa)uOa + (1− α(Oa, Oa))uOa
]
and
1− v =
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)
[
β(Oa, Oa)uOa + (1− β(Oa, Oa))uOa
]
.
Also, this utility function is unique up to a strictly increasing affine transformation.
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4.5. A simpler model
Strat [50] proposes independently, but without any axiomatic justification, a criterion
similar to that of Theorem 4.3 but with a constant parameter α(Oa, Oa) = β(Oa, Oa) = α
that does not depend on the subset a. In a similar way, we can assume that the lower and
upper pessimism indices take on constant values: α(Oa, Oa) = α and β(Oa, Oa) = β, with
0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1. This simple model depends on only r parameters: the utilities of the single
outcomes u{Oi} for i = 2, . . . , r − 1 and the two coefficients α and β. It allows us to recover
some existing decision criteria as special cases:
• When α = β, the utility interval [u](L) is reduced to a point u(L) and we get Strat’s
criterion, also called the generalized Hurwicz criterion in [7], which is a special case of
the real-valued utility (22) in Corollary 4.1;
• In particular, when α = β = 0, then
u(L) =
∑
a⊆O
m(a) min
O∈a
uO, (24)
which is the lower expected utility um with respect to m [5, 40, 6]. As shown by Gilboa
and Schmeidler [25], um is also the Choquet expected utility [3] with respect to the
belief function Belm corresponding to m. The preference relation between bf lotteries
then corresponds to the maximin criterion, which reflects a pessimistic attitude of the
DM.
• Similarly, when α = β = 1, we get
u(L) =
∑
a⊆O
m(a) max
O∈a
uO, (25)
which is the upper expected utility um, or the Choquet expected utility with respect
to the plausibility function Plm corresponding to m [25]. The corresponding decision
strategy corresponds to the maximax criterion, which models an optimistic attitude of
the DM.
• When α = 0 and β = 1, then the interval-valued utility is equal to the lower-upper
expected utility interval
[u](L) = [um, um] .
The corresponding preference relation is then the interval bound dominance relation
[10, 7], defined by
L % L′ ⇔ (um ≥ um′ and um ≥ um′) . (26)
In the general case, we have
um ≤ u ≤ 1− v ≤ um, (27)
where u and w are as in Eq. (21). Thus, the interval-valued utility [u](L) of lottery [O,m] as
defined in Theorem 4.2 is always included in the lower-upper expected utility interval, and
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the preference relation induced by our interval-valued utilities compares more bf lotteries
than the interval dominance relation (26). The lower and upper expectations defined by
Eqs. (24)-(25) can thus be seen as lower and upper bounds of the interval utility of a lottery
L = [O,m] and could be used as conservative estimates if parameters α and β cannot be
elicited.
Example 9. Assume that the set of outcome is O = {$0, $10, $50, $100}. The full model
(without Assumption 4.7) requires the assessment of 24 parameters: u{$10}, u{$50}, and the u
and v values for the 11 subsets of O with cardinality strictly greater than 1. With Assumption
4.7, the number of parameters to be elicited is down to 14: u{$10}, u{$50}, and the α and β
values for the following pairs of worst and best outcomes: ($0, $10), ($0, $50), ($0, $100),
($10, $50), ($10, $100) and ($50, $100). Assuming α and β to be constant brings the number
of parameters to only 4.
A practical elicitation procedure. Whatever the simplifying assumptions made, the trickiest
part for eliciting the interval-valued utility of a bf lottery resides in the determination of
the equivalent bf reference lottery for any non-singleton focal set a (if α and β are assumed
to be constant, this determination needs to be done for only one non-singleton focal set).
Let a˜ = [O2, (ua, va, wa)] be the bf reference lottery equivalent to a (assumed to exist from
Assumption 4.3). For any a probabilistic reference lottery L = [O2, (u, 1 − u)], there are
three cases:
1. If u ≥ 1− va, then L  a˜;
2. If u ≤ ua, then a˜  L;
3. If ua < u ≤ 1− va or ua ≤ u < 1− va, then a˜ and L are incomparable.
To determine ua and va, we can thus start with u = 0 and gradually increase u until a˜ and
L become incomparable, which gives us ua, and then gradually decrease u from u = 1 until
a˜ and L become incomparable, which gives us va. Parameters α and β are then obtained by
solving Eqs. (23). This procedure was used implicitly in Example 4.
5. Comparison with Some Existing Decision Theories
In this section, we compare our utility theory to Jaffray’s linear utility theory [30], Smets’
two-level decision theory [48], decision theories for possibility theory [11, 21] and partially
consonant belief functions [22], and Shafer’s constructive decision theory [44].
5.1. Comparison with Jaffray’s axiomatic theory
Jaffray’s axiomatic theory is based on considering the set of all belief functions on O as
a mixture set as follows. Suppose m1 and m2 are BPAs for O, and suppose λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
m defined as:
m(a) = λm1(a) + (1− λ)m2(a) (28)
for all a ∈ 2O, is a BPA for O. BPA m can be written as m = λm1 + (1− λ)m2, and called
a mixture of m1 and m2. Using the Jensen-version [34] of vN-M axiom system, Jaffray uses
the following axioms, all of which are expressed using mixture BPA functions:
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Assumption 5.1 (Completeness and transitivity). The relation % is complete and transitive
over Lbf .
Assumption 5.2 (Independence). For all L1 = [O,m1] and L2 = [O,m2] in Lbf , and
λ ∈ (0, 1), L1  L2 implies [O, λm1 + (1− λ)m]  [O, λm2 + (1− λ)m].
Assumption 5.3 (Continuity). For all L1 = [O,m1], L2 = [O,m2], and L3 = [O,m3] in
Lbf such that L1  L2  L3, there exists λ and µ in (0, 1) such that
[O, λm1 + (1− λ)m3]  [O,m2]  [O, µm1 + (1− µ)m3].
Theorem 5.1 (Jaffray’s representation theorem [30]). The preference relation % on Lbf
satisfies Assumptions 5.1–5.3 if and only if there exists a utility function u : Lbf → R such
that for any lottery L = [O,m] in Lbf ,
u(L) =
∑
∅6=a⊆O
m(a)ua (29)
where ua = u([O,m
d
a]), and m
d
a is a deterministic BPA for O such that m
d
a(a) = 1.
Thus, Jaffray’s axioms result in the same solution as that of Corollary 4.1, which is a
special case of Theorem 4.2. As Jaffray’s axioms do not use Dempster’s rule explicitly, it
is not clear whether Eq. (29) applies to the D-S framework or not. The mixture BPA m
derived from BPAs m1 and m2 using Eq. (28) is not Dempster’s combination rule, although
Eq. (28) can be derived from a belief function model using Dempster’s rule. In [32], Jaffray
writes:
“It has been shown by [30, 31] that, in the lower probability interpretation of
belief functions, the axioms of von Neumann-Morgenstern linear utility theory
could be justified with the same arguments as in the case of risk (probabilized
uncertainty)” (emphasis added).
Also, in [33], Jaffray and Wakker write:
“Given the widespread use of belief functions, it is remarkable that only recently
were decision criterion for the above-mentioned type of situations proposed and
axiomatized in [30]. He uses as a primitive axiom the independence condition with
respect to mixtures of belief functions over the outcomes to generalize expected
utility: [31] justifies this condition by means of a lower-probability interpretation
of belief functions.” (emphasis added).
Thus, it is clear that Jaffray has in mind the credal set semantics of belief functions,
which are inconsistent with Dempster’s combination rule5.
In comparison, our representation theorem is based on a set of axioms making use of the
basic constructs of DS theory (namely, Dempster’s combination rule, marginalization, and
5It is possible that in 1989, it was not well understood that credal set semantics of belief functions were
incompatible with Dempster’s combination rule. This was apparently clarified in the early 1990s by Shafer
in [42, 43] and also by Fagin and Halpern in [16, 27]
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conditional embedding), we provide more compelling arguments supporting Eq. (29) as a
natural definition of the real-valued utility of a bf lottery in the D-S theory.
Also, there is no explicit notion of a bf reference lottery in Jaffray’s framework. Thanks
to our continuity axiom (Assumption 4.3), the interval-valued utility [ua, 1 − va] in our
framework receives a simple interpretation as an interval-valued probability of a best outcome
O1, in a bf reference lottery [O2,ma] that is indifferent to a and such that ma({O1}) = ua,
ma({Or}) = va, and ma(O2) = 1 − ua − va. We believe that this simple interpretation can
be very helpful when eliciting utilities from DMs, as discussed in Section 4.5.
5.2. Comparison with Smets’ decision theory
Smets’ decision theory [48] is a two-level framework where beliefs, represented by belief
functions, are held at a credal level. When a DM has to make a decision, the marginal belief
function for a variable of interest is transformed into a PMF, and the Bayesian expected
utility framework is then used to make a decision.
Smets uses a transformation called the pignistic transform to transform belief functions
into PMFs. This transform is justified in [49] using a mixture property as follows. Let T
denote the belief-PMF transformation. Smets [49] argues that this transformation should be
linear, i.e., we should have, for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
T (λm1 + (1− λ)m2) = λT (m1) + (1− λ)T (m2). (30)
The unique transformation T verifying (30) is the pignistic transformation defined as T (m) =
BetPm with
BetPm(O) =
∑
a⊆O
m(a)
|a| I(O ∈ a) (31)
for all O ∈ O. The pignistic PMF BetPm is mathematically identical to the Shapley value
in cooperative game theory [45]. In [49], Smets attempts to derive Eq. (30) from the
maximum expected utility principle. The argument, however, is quite technical and not very
compelling.
Given the definition in Eq. (31), the expected utility of a bf lottery L = [O,m] according
to the pignistic PMF is
uBetP (L) =
∑
O∈O
BetPm(O)u{O} (32a)
=
∑
O∈O
(∑
a⊆O
m(a)
|a| I(O ∈ a)
)
u{O} (32b)
=
∑
a⊆O
m(a)
(
1
|a|
∑
O∈a
u{O}
)
. (32c)
It is a special case of Eq. (22), with
ua =
1
|a|
∑
O∈a
u{O}.
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Smets’ decision theory thus amounts to assuming that a DM is indifferent between a bf
lottery that gives them an outcome in a for sure, and a bf reference lottery in which the
probability of the best outcome is equal to the average utilities of the outcomes in a. This
is consistent with our Assumptions 4.1–4.6, but it is inconsistent with Assumption 4.7. For
instance, in Example 8, a DM using the pignistic criterion would strictly prefer b to a, even
though the act f1 generating a dominates the act f2 generating b. Moreover, this restricted
model does not have any parameter to represent a DM’s attitude toward ambiguity. As a
result, it is unable to explain Ellsberg’s paradox and the ambiguity aversion of human DMs
as described, e.g., in the examples presented in Section 4.3.
5.3. Comparison with other axiomatic theories
In this subsection, we compare our axiomatic decision theory with other axiomatic deci-
sion theories for D-S belief functions.
Dubois et al. [11] describe an axiomatic decision theory for the case where uncertainty
is described by a possibility distribution, which is a special case of a belief function with
nested focal elements (such a belief function is said to be consonant). Dubois et al.’s decision
theory consists of two sets of axioms, one for the pessimistic case, and one for the optimistic
case. In contrast, Giang and Shenoy [21] propose an axiomatic theory for possibility theory
with one set of axioms, and the utility function is binary-valued (binary-valued utilities are
possibility distribution values of O1 and Or for possibilistic reference lotteries). The two
axiomatic theories for possibility theory are compared in detail in [21]. The latter theory
is generalized in terms of partially consonant belief functions in [22]. A partially consonant
belief function is a belief function where the set of focal elements can divided into groups
such that (a) the focal elements in different groups are disjoint, and (b) the focal elements
in the same group are nested. The family of partially consonant belief functions include
Bayesian belief functions and consonant belief functions.
Giang [20] compares the Giang-Shenoy decision theory for partially consonant belief
functions with Jaffray’s axiomatic decision theory for general belief functions. Similar to
Jaffray’s theory, our decision theory is for the case of general belief functions. While our
utility is interval-based, leading to incomplete preferences, Jaffray’s theory for general belief
functions, and Giang-Shenoy’s theory for partially consonant belief functions based on binary
utility, result in complete preferences, which is a special case of our theory. Walley [53]
argues that partially consonant belief functions is the only class of D-S belief functions that
is consistent with the likelihood principle of statistics, but this argument applies only to
statistical inference, and not to uncertain reasoning in general.
5.4. Comparison with Shafer’s constructive decision theory
Shafer [44] argues for a decision theory that allows us to construct both goals and beliefs
in response to a decision. In the vN-M utility theory, we start with a probabilistic lottery, and
construct a utility function that reflects a DM’s risk attitude. Thus, probabilities and utilities
are separate constructs that are then combined for the computation of expected utility. In
many situations, we have neither objective nor subjective probabilities. For such situations,
Shafer argues for constructing belief functions from available evidence, and constructing a
set of consistent and monotonic goals. Given a set of actions, we examine which goals each
of the actions will achieve. We use belief functions to make judgments based on evidence
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about what will happen if an action is taken. We then use these belief functions to compute
the expected number of goals that an action will satisfy, and pick an action that satisfies the
most goals. This can be generalized to the case where not all goals are equally weighted,
some are weighted more than others.
Our utility theory is more in line with vN-M utility theory than Shafer’s constructive
decision theory. There is considerable literature in many domains about the use of utility
theory for decision making. While Shafer’s constructive decision theory is intriguing and
may indicate an interesting direction to explore, there is much to be done before we can
apply it in many domains for which we have a decision theory in the vN-M style.
6. Summary and Conclusions
In this section, we summarize our proposal and sketch some future work. We start
with Luce and Raiffa’s version of the vN-M utility theory for probabilistic lotteries. We then
consider bf lotteries, lotteries when our beliefs about the state of the world is described by DS
belief functions. We use a similar set of axioms as vN-M, but first we replace each singleton
outcome in a probabilistic lottery by a focal set of a BPA. Second, we replace the reduction of
compound lotteries with a corresponding axiom that uses Dempster’s combination rule and
belief function marginalization in place of probabilistic combination (pointwise multiplication
followed by normalization) and probabilistic marginalization (addition). Third, we use a bf
reference lottery with two independent parameters. The axioms lead to a decision theory
that involves assessing the utility of each focal element of a BPA as an interval-valued utility.
Interval-valued utilities lead to a partial preference relation on the set Lbf of all bf lotteries. If
we use Bayesian bf reference lotteries with a single parameter, then our axiomatic framework
leads to a real-valued utility function that is exactly the same as in Jaffray’s linear utility
theory [30].
The decision theory that results from our axioms is more general than that proposed by
Jaffray [30], which can be construed as a decision theory for belief functions interpreted as
generalized probabilities. Jaffray’s axiomatic theory is based on a set of mixture BPAs. A
mixture of two BPAs is not the same as a Dempster’s combination of two BPAs, although we
could construct a belief function model where the mixture BPA is obtained by Dempster’s
rule. Thus, it is not clear if Jaffray’s linear utility theory is applicable to D-S belief function
lotteries or not. Our utility theory confirms that this is indeed the case. Our bf reference
lotteries lead to interval-valued utilities, and consequently, a partial preference relation on
the set of all bf lotteries.
We also compare our axiomatic theory to Smets’ two-level framework [48, 49], and note
that his framework is too constrained to explain ambiguity-aversion or ambiguity-seeking
behavior of human DMs. Other axiomatic decision theories proposed by Dubois et al. [11]
and Giang and Shenoy [21, 22] are restricted to consonant or quasi-consonant belief func-
tions. Shafer [44] has recently published his constructive decision theory where he rejects
the separation of beliefs and utilities. He proposes, instead, constructing a set of consistent
and monotonic goals, and measuring the utility of each choice by the number of goals (or
weighted goals) achieved by the choice. Shafer’s constructive decision theory needs to be
fleshed out before it can be applied to practical decision-making situations.
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In practice, implementing the most general form of our axiomatic theory may need as-
sessment of 2 k parameters, where k is the number of focal sets of a bf lottery. In the worst
case, k can be as large as 2|O| − 1. Based on additional assumptions, we propose a model
based on only two parameters, which can be interpreted as reflecting both the DM’s attitude
to ambiguity and their indeterminacy. This model, as well as others, will have to be fur-
ther studied and developed. More generally, a rigorous methodology to elicit interval-valued
utilities remains to be designed and validated experimentally.
Finally, in this paper, we start from the assumption that the D-S formalism is an adequate
model of an agent’s state of knowledge, and we derive a corresponding decision theory from
a set of rationality requirements. Thus, a belief function on the state space is assumed to be
given, and we generate interval-valued expected utilities for bf lotteries. A further step would
be to justify not only utilities, but also the D-S calculus itself (including belief functions and
Dempster’s rule) from properties of the DM’s preference relation over acts, similar to what
Savage [38] did to provide a foundation for decision-making with probability theory, similar
to what Dubois et al. [12] did to justify decision-making with qualitative possibility theory,
and similar to what Gul and Pesendorfer [26], and Zhou et al. [54] did for decision-making
with a theory of belief functions where the belief functions are interpreted as credal sets.
This task remains to be done.
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